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Lane:
Voting Rights
VOTING
RIGHTS

Professor Eric Lane
HonorableLeon D. Lazer:
Our final speaker will discuss the issues of federalism and
voting rights. He has a distinguished background in this area.
Professor Eric Lane of Hofstra is the Eric J. Schmertz
Distinguished Professor of Public Law and Public Service. He
teaches governmental law and is the co-author of two books,
"The Legislative Process " ' and "An Introduction to Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Process."' He served as counsel to
the New York State Temporary Commission on Constitutional
Revision, a commission established by Governor Cuomo, the
from 1993 to 1995. He served as Chair of the New York City
Task Force on Charter Implementation in 1990, and from 1986 to
1989 has served as Executive Director and counsel to the New
York City Charter Revision Commission. Also for six years
served as Chief Counsel to the New York State Senate Minority.
He has an excellent background, which we always demand for the
subjects that he is going to cover. It is my pleasure to introduce
to you Professor Eric Lane.
ProfessorEric Lane:
I am going to try to approach this in a different manner. I will
not go through every one of these cases in detail. Two hundred
years ago, almost to this moment, in the midst of one of the most
intense political battles ever fought, James Madison, in an attempt
to convince people to ratify the newly proposed Constitution,
wrote, in Federalist No. 39,3 "In this relation, the proposed
government cannot be deemed a national one since its jurisdiction
extends to certain enumerated objects only and leaves to the
I ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGsLATrvE
2

PROCESS (1995).
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY

NTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997).
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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several states a residuary inviolable sovereignty over all other
subjects,", 4 and then he continued, "it is true that the
controversies relating to the boundaries between the two
jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be
established by the general government, but this does not change
the principles of the case," 5 thereby laying the groundwork for a
two hundred year old debate.
The debate began almost
immediately. In 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 Justice
Marshall allowed banks to be set up by the federal government
under the necessary and proper clause.7 For two hundred years,
we have debated the question of what federalism means and how
it is to be defined. During this two hundred year period of the
nation's history, the federal government has expanded its power.
This expansion has been in response to the demand by the people.
I think the great Willard Hurst, the legal historian, is accurate
when he says, "Judicial review has had its drama. This may
exaggerate its long-run influence most strikingly shown between
1934 and 1937. In that period the Supreme Court first asserted
and then renounced the greatest control over legislative policy the
judges had ever claimed in the United States." 8
I would like start by trying to define the term "federalism."
What is federalism? There are a number of definitions. The
"federalists" were the ones that were supporting the new
government, and the so-called "anti-federalists" were the ones
opposing it. In truth, the anti-federalists were more federalistic
than the federalists were. The anti-federalists feared the central
4Id.

5 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
6 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Maryland imposed a tax on
banks that were not chartered by the state. Id. at 317. The Supreme Court
held that the imposition of the tax was invalid. Id. at 360. The Court
reasoned that the state did not have the power to impose a tax on the federal
government. Id.
Id. at 353-54 (upholding congress' establishment of a national bank under
its "necessary and proper" powers).

J. WILLIARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, THE LAWMAKERS,
28 (1950).
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power of the government, and the federalists were pushing for
some level of support I like to use federalism to define the
allocation of power in our scheme of government between states,
localities and the federal government, and not as an identification
for a point of view that discusses what the appropriate allocation
should be. A couple of questions I will focus on with respect to
these cases, including the voting rights cases, are as follows:
first, what do the cases of the last two terms of the court mean
for the allocation of power between the federal, state and local
government? Second, what do they predict for the future?
I am sure, you are familiar with the current debate over
federalism. The Republican majority that swept the House of
Representatives in 1994 focused, as part of its Contract with
America9 on state and local government and Congress, in general,

in recent years has been stressing the importance of state and
local governmental decision making. Similarly, President Bill
Clinton has emphasized more local power and more power in the
state legislatures - more policy making closer to home. In some
areas they have actually succeeded to push down decision
making, in others, they have actually centralized more power,
particularly in the criminal area. It is not surprising that this new
federalism does not seem as applicable in the criminal context as
it does on the social slate. It remains politically valuable to
continue and to increase the federal role in the regulation of
criminal behavior. It is not surprising that the courts have also
started to reflect many of the debates that are occurring in public
life and political life. I am going to look at some of the cases
from this perspective.
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,0 the issue for the Court was
whether a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was
unconstitutional." The casinos have benefited a number of tribes,
9 JAEs A. THuRBER & ROGER DAviDsON, REMAKING CONGRESS: CHANGE

AND STABiLrry IN THE 1990s (1995). The Contract with America was a series
of proposals by Republican Congressional candidates during the 1994
Congressional election.
10 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

n 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d) (1988).
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enabling them to generate a great source of revenue. States,
feeling economic pressures in recent years, looked at casinos as a
possible area from which funds for the state treasuries could be
generated. There has been a lot of contention about Indian
gambling, and it was as a result of this that Congress enacted the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Indian Gaming Act set forth
regulatory guidelines that must be followed by the Indian tribes
proposing to operate casinos within a given state. The tribe and
the state are required to negotiate in "good faith" to come to an
agreement in regards to the operation and maintenance of the
particular casino.
During negotiations concerning the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act many Indian tribes were wary of the legislation. They feared
what would happen if a given governor of a state negotiating on
behalf of the state, attempted to delay negotiations. In response,
Congress created this right to have the formation of a compact
negotiated in good faith. 2 Additionally, Congress further
allowed the state to be sued in federal court on the basis that the
governors were not negotiating in good faith. 13

12 25

U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A) (1988). Section (d)(3)(A) provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands
upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or
is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands
are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal/State compact governing the conduct of
gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State
shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into

such a compact.
Id. (emphasis added).
13

25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d) (1988). This Act provides in pertinent part:
(7)(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction
over:
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising
from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the
Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal/State
compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations
in good faith....

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/9
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In Seminole Tribe,1 4 plaintiffs claimed that the governor refused
to negotiate in good faith. In the first instance, he claimed he
was not trying to delay negotiations. 5 He claimed it was difficult
to reach a common ground between what the Seminole Indians
were proposing and what the state was willing to accept. 6
Furthermore, he indicated that the provision that allows the states
to be sued by citizens of their own state violated the Eleventh
Amendment. 7 The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution
gives states sovereign immunity.' 8 Its literal language is identical
to the diversity language in Article 3 of the Constitution. 9 It
does not textually prohibit citizens suing their own states, but it
has been expanded to cover such situations. m The question
presented to the court in Seminole Tribe was whether Congress
had the power to allow Indian tribes to sue the government of the
states in which they resided. 2' The asserted bases for the statute
was the Fourteenth Amendment and the Indian Commerce
Clause.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress authorization of
actions against states had been ruled constitutional. In Fitzpatrick
14116

S. Ct. 1114 (1996)

at 1121.
1 d.at 1123.

1Id.

171d.
18 U.S.

amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state or subjects of any foreign state." Id.
'9U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article HI, section 2 provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity... to controversies between a state and citizens of
another state; between citizens of different states; between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
Id.
1o See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Although the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment appears to bar suits from citizens of one state against
another state, the Supreme Court has expanded that interpretation to apply to
suits between citizens of the state versus their own state. Id at 21.
21Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
CONST.
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v. Bitzer,22 the Court indicated that the state's Eleventh
Amendment rights could be limited by Congress in certain
instances.53
The second basis has been the Commerce Clause.24 In
Seminole Tribe, the tribe argued that the Court could rely on the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states sovereign

immunity. 5

The Court disregarded this argument holding,

controversially, that the Commerce Clause itself was not a basis
for abrogating the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, it did not
have to reach the point of dealing with the distinction between the
Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause.
This decision was 5-4 decisions. It is difficult to determine a
trend when you have 5-4 decisions. When you have five-four
decisions, it means that the issue is not settled. One new judge
can change the constitutional interpretation, particularly, if as the
majority in Seminole Tribe states, precedent is only policy.26
Seminole Tribe places a limitation on Congressional power. If
the position taken in Seminole Tribe is continued, it may prove to
be problematic for Congress. The power that it limits is one of
the ways that Congress tries to make the states accountable. By
22 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, male Connecticut employees brought
action alleging that the state's statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated
against them because of their sex. Id. at 448. The Supreme Court held that
the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and that, accordingly, back pay and attorney fee
awards were not precluded under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 456. If
Congress has passed a statute pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment which
gives a private citizen a right to sue, the statute will be enforced and will not
be deemed to violate the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
23 Id.

24 U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8. Article I, section 8 provides: "The Congress

shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with Indian Tribes." Id.
' Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. Petitioner contended that the Indian
Commerce Clause vests the Federal government with the "duty of protecting"
the tribes from "ill feeling and the people of the state." Id. (citing United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886)). Petitioner further contended
that abrogation was necessary "to protect the tribes." Id.
26 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
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allowing private suits against the states, Congress can compel
states to abide by statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendments. If this limitation is
maintained it would certainly be a curtailment of Congressional

power and Congressional self-definition of its own authority.
After two hundred years of basically allowing Congress to
expand, to define, the Commerce Clause for itself, the Court in

United States v. Lopei 7 limited Congress' authority to set the
clause's parameters.' Some have thought Lopez revolutionary."
Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Act of 1990,"° which made it
a federal offense for an individual to possess a firearm within a
certain distance of a school. 31 The statute made no reference to

interstate commerce, which to some, for some reason, is
meaningful. 32 The issue before the Court was whether Congress
could create a zone of protection around schools and prohibit the
possession of a gun within that zone. The Court, again by a five-

27 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

' Id. at 552. See also Charles Fried, ForwardRevolutions?, 109 HARV. L.

REv. 13 (1995) (arguing that the Court's holding in Lopez was startling
because "the Supreme Court, for the first time since 1936, found that
Congress had exceeded the limits of the interstate Commerce Clause.").
29 See Louis H. Pollak, Forward, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995). See also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Gov't of
Limited And EnumeratedPowers': In Defense of U.S. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 752 (1995) (arguing that the Lopez decision marks a "revolutionary and
long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is one of
limited and enumerated powers.").
30 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(2)(A) (1997). This section provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe is a school
zone." Id.
' 1Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
32 Id. The legislation contained no requirement that the firearm had moved
in interstate commerce, nor was it accompanied by Congressional findings
regarding the effects of gun possession in school on interstate commerce. Id.
See Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the
Commerce Clause, 74 Tax. L. REV. 719, 750 (1996) (discussing a statement
by officials at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms noting that the
"Act differs from other federal firearms legislation in its lack of reference to
commerce.").
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four margin, held that the Act was beyond the scope of
Commerce Clause power.33
The Court's decision seems
confusing on this issue, one part of the Court seems to emphasize
the fact that there is no statement or finding in the statute itself
that says that this type of activity is interstate commerce." This
would be a doubtful standard, stressing form over substance.
Most likely the Court simply viewed the act as beyond the
Commerce Clause, that is that the link between the possession of
guns in the prohibited school zone and economy simply was too

tenuous.35 Although Justice Breyer, in dissent, makes a strong
argument to the contrary.3 6
If this is the sum total of the decision then there is no need for
alarm or cheer at this point. There is no evidence yet to
determined whether the case is sui generis or signals a
reexamination of interstate commerce jurisprudence. If of course
this case does represent a restriction on the linkage between the
" Id. at 552. The Court identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power. Id. at 558. "First,
Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce." Id.
"Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from interstate activities." Id. "Finally,
Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 588-89.
34 Id. at 561. At the outset, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the act is
[N]ot a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate
transportation of a commodity through the channels of
commerce, nor can 922(q) be justified as a regulation by
which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce.
Id. at 559. The Court went on to state that the validity of the Act depended
entirely on a showing that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. Id.
" Id. at 557 (stating that "possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.").
36 Id. at 618-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that violent crimes that
occur in school zones substantially affect interstate commerce because violence
in schools interferes with the quality of education, which in turn affects the
nation's economy and specifically, the job market).
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regulation and interstate commerce, that would be an significant
assault on Congressional power, throwing into question must of
the progressive civil rights legislation from the 1960s onward.
The third case, Printz v. United States," involved the

background check provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act [hereinafter the "Brady Bill"].38 The question
presented was whether or not the federal government could order
chief law enforcement officers of particular to do background

checks on potential purchasers of firearms. 39 The background
check provision was temporary, until the federal computer system
went into play.' Several chief law enforcement officers from
Montana challenged this interim provision of the Brady Bill. 4'
Relying on the principles enunciated in New York v. United
States,42 the Court concluded that the Federal Government may

3

117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
18 U.S.C. § 922 (s)(1) (1998). This section states in pertinent part:
Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of
enactment of this subsection and ending on the day before the
date that is 60 months after such date of enactment, it shall
be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, or licensed dealer to sell, deliver, or transfer a
handgun... to an individual who is not licensed under
section 923, unless... (IO within 1 day... provided
notice of the contents of the statement to the chief law
enforcement officer of the place of residence of the
transferee; and (IV) within 1 day after the transferee
furnishes the statement, transmitted a cdpy of the statement
to the chief law enforcement officer of the place of residence
of the transferee; and (ii) (I) 5 business days... have
elapsed from the date the transferor furnished notice of the
contents of the statement to the chief law enforcement
officer, during which period the transferor has not received
information from the chief law enforcement officer that
receipt or possession of the handgun by the transferee would
be in violation of Federal, State, or local law....

Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.

41

Id. at 2369.

42 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

In New York, the Court held that the "take-title'
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 1985,
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not force the States to "enact or administer a federal regulatory
program."4 3 Justice Scalia opined that the Court really could not
find explicit textual support for its position, but discovered such
prohibition in a location infrequently visited by him--the
penumbra of the Constitution. 4 Somewhere lurking in the
various prohibitions, is the right of sheriffs to be excused from

the responsibility for following federal orders.45
Another case which limits Congressional power is City of
Boerne v. Flores.46 This case challenged the constitutionality of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [hereinafter
"RFRA"]. 4 7 RFRA prohibited the federal government from
substantially burdening an individual's exercise of religious
freedom even if the burden is a result of a rule of general
applicability unless the government is able to show that the
burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
and is the least restrictive way of furthering that interest. The
Court concluded (6-3) that the statute exceeded Congressional
power, because under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has the power to pass only remedial or
preventative legislation. 48
was unconstitutional. Id. at 175-76. The act required States to enact
legislation which provided for the disposal of the radioactive waste within their
borders, or take title and possession of the waste. Id. The Court concluded
that the Federal Government "may not compel the States to enact or administer
a federal regulatory program." Id. at 188.
41 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
44Id. at 2370
45Id. at 2372.
46 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). In Boerne, a decision by local zoning officials,
which denied a church a building permit to enlarge its building, was
challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Id. at 2160.
47 Id. at 2160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-1 (1995 Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2162.
48 Id. at 2160.. Id. at 2164. The Court indicated that "while the line
between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed." Id. "There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
mean adopted to that end." Id. Without this connection, legislation has the
potential to become substantial in both operation and effect. Id.
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I think that these four cases are different enough, unclear
enough and of such narrow majority that they tell us little about
the Court's perspective on federalism. If there is a trend toward
states' rights, it continuation will depend on the future
composition of the Court and hence who the President is. This
points to the political nature of the Court with respect to such
notions. It also demonstrates, in a sense, how prominent current
policy debates can be at the Court and how thin an idea
originalism is. I cannot imagine appearing before Chief Justice
John Marshall,4 9 sitting there in his wig, without the benefits of
modem day society and asking him what his thoughts are on each
of these cases. He would not know what an airplane is nor would
he know what a car is. It would be pretty hard to think of it from
an originalist perspective. What I do think the cases most clearly
demonstrate is how shifts in the political debate of the country
really do influence the Court, and how the same battles that occur
in the country, occur in the Court as well.
I am going to take a couple of minutes now to talk about voting
rights cases because you will see the same underlying principles
examined in the previous cases, also applicable to the voting right
cases. These are all five-four decisions with Justice O'Connor
struggling to find the applicable role of race in redistricting."'

The analysis of all of these cases begins with Shiv v. Reno,51 in
which the Court held that appellants stated a claim for relief
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Up until that point, the cases had basically focused on addressing
the scope of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act after
49 John

Marshall was appointed by President John Adams in 1801 and. served
on the bench until his death on July 6, 1835. Charles Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History, 286, 797 (1922). For a discussion of Justice
Marshall's life and major decisions, see Felix Frankfurter,John Marshall and
die Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217 (1955); CHARLES F. HOBSON,
THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996);
G. EDWARD WHiTE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1991).
1 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
51509 U.S. 630 (1993). In Shaw, appellants alleged that North Carolina
deliberately segregated voters by race when it created two majority black
congressional district. Id. at 633-34. Id. at 658.
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Thornburg v. Gingle.52 Thornburg was the first case to interpret

the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended. 53 These amendments set forth a clear effects test,
which permitted a plaintiff to establish a violation of the Voting
Rights Act by showing the discriminatory effect of a voting
practice, rather than an intent to discriminate. It is interesting to
note that the 1982 Amendments were cast with Republican
Ronald Reagan as the president and the Republican Robert Dole
as the Senate majority leader. It was an extraordinary effort by
the civil rights movement that this amendment was ever passed.
They made it a much tougher bill from a pro-voting-rights
perspective and from a pro-central-government perspective than it
had been before
52 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

In Thornburg, the Court identified three conditions
that a plaintiff must meet in order to demonstrate a violation of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. at 50-51. First, the minority group must show that it is
"sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district."
Id. at 50.
The minority group must then
demonstrate that it is politically cohesive. Id. at 51. Finally, the minority
group must show that the white majority votes sufficiently impede its ability to
elect its chosen candidates. Id.
53 Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 13 (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1988)). This section provides in pertinent part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color .... A
violation of subdivision (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political process
leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members
of a class of citizens protected by subdivision (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Id.
5 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 846 (June 29, 1982). On June 29, 1982,
President Reagan signed into law the Voting Rights Act amendments,
proclaiming "the right to vote is the crown jewel of American liberties, and
we will not see its luster diminished." Id.
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There are two major parts of Voting Rights Section Two and
Section Five.55 Section Two, which applies to everybody in the
country, basically says that minorities can not be denied the

opportunity to participate in the political process.) Section Five,
is a unique provision. Under Section Five, changes in law by
states or localities effecting voting require preclearance by the
Justice Department or a federal court, ' if those states or
I See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Specifically, Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 provides in pertinent part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color... as
provided in subdivision (b) of this section.
A violation of subdivision (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to a nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subdivision (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population.
Id.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
Specifically, Section Five reads in pertinent
part:
[Sluch State or subdivision may institute an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, or practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in [42 U.S.C. § 1973(f) (2)], and unless
and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be
denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such
5642
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localities had a voting test or device and fell below a certain
standard based on voting registration and voter turn out during a
presidential elections.58 Section 5 jurisdictions include: three
counties located in New York City, the South, Texas, Alaska,
and a number of other jurisdictions. By way of example, when I
was counsel to the New York City Charter Revision Commission,
we made huge changes to the charter, such as, the creation of a
larger council consisting of fifty-one members. We sent all of the
changes down for pre-clearance because three of New York
City's counties were covered under Section Five. It is an
enormous federal power. If an objection had been made to one
word or provision, even though a referendum of New York City
had already been passed, we would have to start all over again.
Again, it is an enormous federal power.
In the cases we are discussing, white people charge that
districting plans deny them equal protection of the law. In each
case, the complaints alleged that a particular district was drawn
based on racial preference only. In other words, racial interest
dominated the drawing of these lines. In Shaw v. Reno, 59 the
parent of all these cases, the district of North Carolina's second
redistricting plan resembled the shape of a dumbbell. Justice
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure:
Provided, that such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal
officer or other appropriate official of such state or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated
that such objection will not be made.
Id.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (b) (1994). A jurisdiction is covered under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act if it has maintained a voting "test or device." Id.
Moreover, less than 50% of voting-age residents in the jurisdiction must have
registered to vote or have actually voted in the presidential elections of 1964,
1968, or 1972. Id.
59 630 U.S. 630 (1993)). See Thomas C. Goldstein, Unpacking & Applying
Shaw v. Reno, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1135 (1994) (analyzing Shaw and
discussing future applications of the decision).
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O'Connor basically says that the district is too ugly to be drawn
for any reason racial districting. Justice O'Connor is careful to
explain that race may play a role in districting, but race must not
be the only factor.' But, for her, the district in Shiny is drawn
entirely on the basis of racial considerations. 61 The case was
remanded to allow North Carolina to provide its reasons for the
district. 62 Such reasons might include the joining of urban
interests or any other basis which supported the dumbbell shape.6
Shaw introduced for the first time equal protection
jurisprudence as an overlay on voting rights jurisprudence. The

cases that followed were: Miller v. Johnson,61 Bush v. Vera,5
Shaw v. Hunt,6 which is Shaw 2, and Abrams v. Johnson,6'
oId. at 646. According to Justice O'Connor:
[R]edisticting differs from other kinds of state
decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race
when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age,
economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a
variety of other demographic factors. That sort of race
consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race
discrimination.
Id.
6 Id. at 647. The Court reasoned that: "A reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who
may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." Id.
6Id. at 658.
6 Id. at 654-56.
6 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
In Miller, Georgia residents challenged the
constitutionality of Georgia's congressional redistricting plan. Id. at 903. The
Court held that the redistricting plan was unconstitutional because it was
drawn predominately to benefit minorities and lacked compelling state interest.
Id. at 917.
61 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). In Bush, six Texas voters challenged the Texas
redistricting plan arguing that the districts constituted racial gerrymanders,
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1950. The Court held that the
district lines were unconstitutional, reasoning that the district lines were
subject to strict scrutiny and were not tailored to further a compelling state
interest. Id. at 1951.
6 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). In Shaw, North Carolina residents brought suit
seeking to challenge North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan. Id. at
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which is Miller v. Johnson 2. I will not into the details of each of
these cases, I will discuss only two points about them. First,
after Abrams v. Johnson,68 it is almost impossible to factor in
race, even if we still accept Justice O'Connor's caveat that race
can, in fact, be used in the drawing of lines.69 If I were a local
official doing this kind of work, I would not know how you
would do it. I think Justice Breyer is right when he says, that
those who draw the lines are clueless as to how race should be
applied. All of these cases involved a different variation of
Most of these districting lines are compact,
districting.
contiguous, and do not form the shape of a dumbbell. Yet, it is
difficult to understand how race will be factored in when drawing
the lines. Second, you have the command of the Voting Rights
Act. Under the Voting Rights Act, there is an obligation to
construct a districting plan that does not deny minorities the
opportunity to participate in the political process.70 In other
words, the Act commands that race be considered.
I leave you with this final note from Justice O'Connor,
notwithstanding what looks like an irresolvable conundrum, she
says: "I still believe you can work out some jurisprudential
relationship between Section Two and the Equal Protection
Clause to allow race to be a factor in drawing."'" If any of you
are interested in changing your position or changing your
profession, or would like to get involved in a new area of law,
start learning these cases now. It will only be a couple of years
before districting will occur all over the country. Thereafter
thousands of cases will arise and these cases pay well. In
addition, the government will pay part of your fees.

1899. The Court held that the redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. Id.
67

117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997) (holding that race cannot be a predominant factor

in drawing district lines).
68Id.
69 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
71Shaw

v. Reno, 630 U.S. 630, 646 .(1993).
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Historically, it is not clear what this is going to mean.
Decisions concerning the balance between state, federal, and
municipal power will depend upon the politics of the Court.
Unquestionably, three members of the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, and Scalia, who are dedicated
federalists, in the anti-federalist meaning of that word, would
likely reduce federal power across the board. As for the other
six, including Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, I think they are
much more in the middle and a lot will depend on what happens
with the Court in the future. Thank you.
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